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I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se litigants—parties representing themselves without assis-
tance of counsel—have steadily been on the increase since the late
1990s.1  According to the Administrative Office of the United States,
the number of civil pro se cases filed in U.S. district courts in fiscal
year 2010 was 24,319, increased from 20,545 in fiscal year 2007.2  One
of the primary factors fueling the rise in pro se litigants is the prohibi-
tive cost of full-service legal representation.3  Unable to afford law-
yers, these individuals face the choice of allowing their claims to lapse
or representing themselves.  The increased number of parties repre-
senting themselves has resulted in a number of challenges for the ju-
diciary and the legal profession at large.  In order to help pro se
litigants, courts have adopted rules giving leniency to individuals rep-
resenting themselves.4  Meanwhile, lawyers adverse to pro se litigants
experience added challenges when their opponents are unfamiliar
with legal rules and procedures.5
Perhaps the greatest challenges resulting from the growth of pro se
litigants have been the ethical and procedural concerns surrounding
the practice of ghostwriting.  Ghostwriting occurs when an attorney
enters into limited representation for the sole purpose of anonymously
drafting “particular pleadings or other court documents” for “clients
who go on to represent themselves in court pro se.”6  While ghost-
writing holds the potential to increase access to legal representation
for low-income litigants, federal courts have almost universally con-
demned ghostwriting as a breach of an attorney’s ethical and profes-
sional duties.7  However, the Second Circuit’s recent decision in In re
1. Jona Goldschmidt, An Analysis of Ghostwriting Decisions: Still Searching for the
Elusive Harm, 95 JUDICATURE 78, 79 (2011).
2. Federal Caseload Trend: More Civil Cases Being Filed Without Lawyer’s Help,
THIRD BRANCH NEWS (June 15, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/
11-06-15/Federal_Caseload_Trend_More_Civil_Cases_Being_Filed_Without_Law
yer_s_Help.aspx (these numbers are civil pro se cases filed by nonprison inmates;
when civil cases filed by inmates are included, the total number of pro se cases
filed in fiscal year 2012 was 72,900, up from a total of 70,240 in fiscal year 2007).
3. Goldschmidt, supra note 1, at 78.
4. Peter M. Cummins, The Cat-O’-Ten Tails: Pro Se Litigants Assisted by Ghost-
writing Counsel, FOR DEFENSE, Apr. 2011, at 40.
5. Margery A. Gibbs, More Are Serving As Their Own Lawyer, BOSTON GLOBE
(Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/11/28/more_are
_serving_as_their_own_lawyer/?camp=pm (stating that cases against pro se liti-
gants are often more lengthy and costly).
6. John C. Rothermich, Ethical and Procedural Implications of “Ghostwriting” for
Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2687, 2692 (1999) (emphasis added).
7. Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that undisclosed
ghostwriting by an attorney violates his duty of candor to the tribunal and would
also likely qualify as professional misconduct under Model Rules 8.4(c) and (d));
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Liu8 rejected the notion that ghostwriting constituted sanctionable
misconduct. The development of this circuit spilt on the issue of ghost-
writing, as well as evolving trends in ethics opinions and professional
rules of responsibility, presents a timely opportunity to revisit the eth-
ical and procedural concerns surrounding ghostwriting.
This Note will examine the ethical and procedural concerns sur-
rounding ghostwriting, as well as the justifications supporting its
practice, in an effort to determine how courts should address ghost-
writing.  Part II will present the background of ghostwriting and the
concerns raised by its practice.  First, this Note will give a brief expla-
nation of ghostwriting and its relation to the larger movement of un-
bundled legal services.  Next, this Note will outline the current circuit
court precedents on the issue of ghostwriting, focusing specifically on
the ethical and procedural concerns raised by the practice. Part III
will examine the shortcomings of both the majority stance against
ghostwriting and the minority posture that ghostwriting is not at odds
with ethical and procedural rules.  This Note concludes that both the
majority and minority positions on ghostwriting are flawed and that
reform is necessary to resolve the discrepancies between ghostwriting
as a part of limited-scope representation and the ethical and procedu-
ral obligations to which lawyers are bound.  Ultimately, this Note pro-
poses a solution that supports the best interests of the courts, lawyers,
and pro se litigants by remedying the flaws of the majority and minor-
ity stances, as well as eliminating the current contradictions about
ghostwriting caused by procedural and ethical rules.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ghostwriting and Limited-Scope Representation
Ghostwriting is just one facet of a broader practice known as lim-
ited-scope representation, or unbundled legal services.9  When most
people think of legal representation, they have in mind traditional,
full-service representation.  In traditional, full-service legal represen-
tation, the attorney assists the client in the matter from start to fin-
ish, undertaking all of the different legal services necessary to bring
about a resolution.10  In limited-scope representation, however, a law-
yer’s representation of a client is confined to discrete legal tasks—
such as legal research, fact gathering, negotiating, document drafting,
or court representation—which the clients select to fit their budget
Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (disapproving of the practice of
ghostwriting as a violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11).
8. 664 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2011).
9. Rothermich, supra note 6, at 2691–92.
10. Id. at 2690.
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and their needs.11  In 2002, the American Bar Association (ABA) re-
vised its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to permit limited-scope
representation, as long as the representation is reasonable under the
circumstances and the client gives informed consent.12  To date, forty-
one states have adopted this Model Rule, or a variation of it, permit-
ting limited-scope representation in their jurisdiction.13
The main benefit of the limited-scope representation model of legal
services is that providing legal services in this a` la carte manner al-
lows many low- and moderate-income individuals access to legal rep-
resentation that they would otherwise be unable to afford under the
traditional model of full-scale representation.14  National and state
studies indicate that nearly eighty percent of low-income individuals
in America have unmet legal needs.15  Furthermore, without some le-
gal assistance from a licensed attorney, many pro se litigants ulti-
mately end up forfeiting their legal rights.16  While unbundled legal
services allow the client and the lawyer to limit the scope of the repre-
sentation and services the lawyer is providing, the lawyer’s ethical ob-
ligations and professional responsibilities remain unchanged.17
Courts have uniformly agreed that licensed attorneys do not vio-
late procedural and ethical rules when giving legal assistance to fam-
11. SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD 69
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2009); STANDING COMM. ON THE DE-
LIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS, AM. BAR ASS’N, AN ANALYSIS OF RULES THAT ENABLE
LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS: A WHITE PAPER 7–8 (2009) [hereinafter
ABA WHITE PAPER], http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/delivery/down
loads/prose/_white_paper.pdf (outlining the changes to the ABA Model Rule 1.2
adopted in 2002 as a result of the Ethics 2000 Commission).
13. STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS, UNBUNDLING FACT SHEET
(2011) [hereinafter ABA UNBUNDLING FACT SHEET], http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/delivery/downloads/20110331_unbund
ling_fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf; see also John T. Broderick Jr. & Ronald M.
George, Op-Ed., A Nation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/opinion/02broderick.html?_r=0 (explaining
the growth of limited-scope representation and its benefits).
14. Rothermich, supra note 6, at 2690–91 (stating a substantial part of the low- and
moderate-income populations are unable to afford legal representation under the
traditional representation model and that, as an alternative to the full-service
model, unbundled legal services seek to provide increased access to the judicial
system for these populations); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2
cmt. 6 (2009) (stating a client may choose to limit the scope of representation in
order to exclude actions the client may think are too costly); see also Jeffrey P.
Justman, Note, Capturing the Ghost: Expanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 to Solve Procedural Concerns with Ghostwriting, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1246, 1250
(2008) (stating that full-service litigation is often too costly for low-income
litigants).
15. Justman, supra note 14, at 1251.
16. Rothermich, supra note 6, at 2689.
17. ABA UNBUNDLING FACT SHEET, supra note 13.
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ily and friends,18 nor when giving minor undocumented assistance to
a client.19  Rather, in order to constitute ghostwriting, the attorney
must provide substantial legal assistance to the pro se litigant without
entering an appearance in the matter or otherwise identifying her in-
volvement in the case.20
B. The Majority
The First and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal, along with district
courts in the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, have condemned
ghostwriting.  These courts have cited concerns that ghostwriting con-
stitutes a violation of procedural rules under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 11 and ethics rules governing candor to the tribunal
and misrepresentation.21
1. Rule 11 Concerns
Courts have almost universally expressed concerns that ghost-
writing violates Rule 11. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 re-
quires “every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by
a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”22  By presenting a
signed document in court, the attorney or the pro se party, as the
signer, certifies that to the best of her knowledge, the document is not
being presented for an improper purpose, the claims presented are
warranted by existing law, and the factual contentions have eviden-
tiary support.23  A court may impose sanctions on “any attorney, law
firm, or party that violate[s] [Rule 11] or is responsible for the
violation.”24
The First Circuit decided the initial case addressing the issue of
ghostwriting in Ellis v. Maine.25  In dicta, the court condemned the
growing number of petitions where “the petitioner appears pro se, as-
serts complete ignorance of the law, and then presents a brief
which . . . was manifestly written by someone with legal knowledge.”26
The court cited Rule 11 in its disapproval of ghostwriting, explaining
that lawyers who prepare such briefs and do not sign them “thus es-
18. Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998); In re Mungo, 305
B.R. 762, 767–68 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003);.
19. Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (stating that ghostwriting occurs when an attorney
has played a “substantial role in the litigation”).
20. Justman, supra note 14, at 1252–53.
21. See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001), Ellis v. Maine, 448
F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1971).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
23. Id. 11(b)(1)–(3).
24. Id. 11(c).
25. 448 F.2d 1325.
26. Id. at 1328.
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cape the obligation imposed on members of the bar, typified by
F.R.Civ.P. 11 [sic] . . . of representing to the court that there is good
ground to support the assertions made.”27
The Tenth Circuit also expressed concerns with the Rule 11 impli-
cations of ghostwriting, noting that attorneys who anonymously draft
pleadings “necessarily guide the course of litigation with an unseen
hand.”28  The court noted that the absence of an attorney’s signature
“inappropriately shields [the attorney] from responsibility and ac-
countability for his actions and counsel.”29
District courts in other circuits have further elaborated on the
problem created by ghostwriting under Rule 11.30  In Laremont-Lopez
v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Center,31 the court noted the
purpose of Rule 11 is “to deter conduct that frustrates the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of civil actions.”32  The court reflected
that when ghostwritten pleadings are filed for an improper purpose or
without sufficient factual basis, in violation of Rule 11, the question of
whom to sanction becomes murky.33  If the court sanctioned the pro se
litigant for signing the pleading, the pro se litigant might assert im-
munity because the attorney drafted the pleadings.34  Conversely, the
court might be unable to sanction the attorney who drafted the plead-
ing if it is unable to ascertain the attorney’s identity.  Even if the court
is able to uncover attorneys’ identities, “the additional inquiry necessi-
tated by the lawyers’ failure to sign the pleadings interferes with the
‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of those actions.”35
Thus, Laremont-Lopez held that the absence of the drafting attorney’s
signature on ghostwritten pleadings undermines the purpose of Rule
11 sanctions.36
Lastly, in addition to potentially impeding the courts’ ability to ad-
minister speedy trials and identify attorneys in need of reprimand,
courts have noted ghostwriting can complicate the question of when
penalties are proper.  In United States v. Eleven Vehicles,37 the court
27. Id.
28. Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Fremont, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo. 1994)).
29. Id. at 1272.
30. Liguori v. Hansen, No. 2:11-CV-00492-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 760747 (D. Nev.
Mar. 6, 2012); Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Haw. 2010);
Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Clarke v. United States,
955 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Va. 1997); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762 (Bankr. D.S.C.
2003).
31. 968 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997).
32. Id. at 1078.
33. Id. at 1079.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
36. Id.
37. 966 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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noted that “certain conduct may be sanctionable if committed by coun-
sel but not if committed by a party.”38  Accordingly, the court held that
the identity of the drafter of the pleadings is “therefore important to
the administration of justice in the case.”39  As these cases have illus-
trated, courts in the majority believe that ghostwriting interferes with
the court’s ability to properly oversee parties and counsel during the
course of litigation as provided under Rule 11.
2. Liberal Pleading Concerns
The second concern the majority cases shared about the practice of
ghostwriting concerned the court’s practice of giving leniency to pro se
pleadings.  In Haines v. Kerner,40 the Supreme Court established the
precedent that a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must
be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”41  The Court explained that in such cases, pleadings “can
only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitled him to relief.’ ”42  While the pro se litigant in
Haines was an inmate representing himself in a claim of injuries and
deprivation of rights while in solitary confinement,43 the liberal plead-
ing standard applies to all pro se litigants.44
In Duran, the Tenth Circuit noted the leniency afforded to pro se
litigants was created to make up for the pro se litigant’s lack of legal
expertise.45  Thus, the absence of an attorney’s signature on a plead-
ing anonymously prepared not only has Rule 11 implications, but its
absence also requires the court to interpret the pro se litigant’s plead-
ing with leniency.46  And when the pro se litigant is unwarranted in
receiving the advantage of the liberal pleading rule—such as when the
pleading is actually anonymously written by an attorney—the oppos-
ing party is put at a distinct disadvantage.  In such a situation, the
opposing party is held to a more demanding standard,47 despite both
parties having had the benefit of assistance from legal counsel.  Put
another way, by personally signing a pleading filed with the court, a
litigant is “invoking the leniency of the court.”48  However, when such
38. Id. at 367.
39. Id.
40. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
41. Id. at 520.
42. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21).
43. Haines, 404 U.S. at 519.
44. See generally Rothermich, supra note 6, at 2698–99.
45. See, e.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001).
46. Id.
47. Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Fremont, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231
(D. Colo. 1994).
48. Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Kan. 1997).
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a pleading has actually been authored by a licensed attorney, the pro
se litigant “may not have a right to assert her pro se status for that
purpose,” as doing so gives her an unwarranted advantage.49
District court decisions in other circuits have also attributed un-
fairness to construing a pleading liberally for a pro se litigant, when in
fact the party has benefitted from the assistance of counsel.50  Moreo-
ver, courts have pointed out the unfair leniency accorded to pro se liti-
gants with ghostwritten pleadings “negatively taint[s] the Court
towards the appearance of well meaning pro se litigants who have no
legal guidance” and who rely on the court’s discretion to level the
field.51 In sum, courts in the majority find that when ghostwritten
pleadings are unnecessarily given the benefits of the liberal pleading
rule, the pro se litigants gain an advantage at the expense of the op-
posing party, while also undermining the courts’ willingness to con-
strue the pleading liberally for true pro se litigants.
3. Professional Responsibility
The last concern courts frequently highlight when condemning
ghostwriting is related to an attorney’s ethical obligations found in
state professional responsibility laws.  All states adopt their own rules
of professional responsibility and ethics applicable to lawyers practic-
ing in their jurisdiction.52  Although these rules vary by jurisdiction,
many of the rules mirror the American Bar Association’s Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.
a. Candor to the Tribunal and Misrepresentation
The first rules of professional responsibility implicated by ghost-
writing are those related to an attorney’s obligation of honesty to the
court and honesty in their actions.  The Model Rules proscribe, “A law-
yer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to the
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1223 (D. Haw. 2010)
(“[I]n light of the assistance Plaintiff received from counsel, the Court will not
liberally construe [the pleading] as it normally would for a pro se party.”); Ricotta
v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that allowing a pro
se litigant to receive “such latitude [from a liberal pleading] in addition to assis-
tance from an attorney would disadvantage the nonoffending party”); United
States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Laremont-Lopez
v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997) (hold-
ing that when ghostwritten pleadings are filed “the indulgence extended to the
pro se party has the perverse effect of skewing the playing field rather than level-
ing it”).
51. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Lauren A. Weeman, Note, Bending the (Ethical) Rules in Arizona: Ethics
Opinion 05-06’s Approval of Undisclosed Ghostwriting May Be a Sign of Things to
Come, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1045 (2006) (noting that states chose to
adopt the Model Rules).
2014] UNMASKING THE GHOST 663
tribunal . . . .”53  Additionally, the Model Rules state, “it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”54
In Duran, the Tenth Circuit noted the duty of candor to the court
required in Model Rule 3.3 has significant implications for ghostwrit-
ten pleadings.55  The court reasoned, “If neither a ghostwriting attor-
ney nor her pro se litigant discloses the fact that any
pleadings . . . were actually drafted by the attorney, this could itself
violate the duty of candor.”56  Furthermore, the court stated that un-
disclosed ghostwriting would “likely qualify as professional miscon-
duct under Model Rule 8.4(c) . . . [which] prohibit[s] conduct involving
misrepresentation . . . .”57
Other courts have agreed that situations where lawyers anony-
mously draft pleadings that a party then signs pro se “implicate[ ] the
lawyer’s duty of candor to the court.”58  As one court explained, “the
party’s representation to the court that he is pro se is not true when
the pleadings are being prepared by the lawyer.”59
b. Terminating Representation
Courts condemning ghostwriting also invoke the ethical rules re-
lating to terminating representation.  The Model Rules provide that “a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effects on the interest of the
client . . . .”60  Additionally, “a lawyer must comply with applicable law
requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a rep-
resentation.”61  In many jurisdictions, once an attorney has entered
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2009).
54. Id. 8.4(c).
55. 238 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also
Liguori v. Hansen, No. 2:11-CV-00492-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 760747 (D. Nev.
Mar. 6, 2012) (holding that the level of candor expected of members of the bar is
implicated when a party appears pro se after an attorney has drafted the plead-
ings); Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Haw. 2010) (indicat-
ing an attorney’s candor to the court is implicated when attorneys ghostwrite
pleadings); Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (recognizing
that ghostwriting a pleading for a pro se litigant is “far below the level of candor
which must be met by members of the bar”); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2003) (stating ghostwriting a pleading for a pro se litigant violates an at-
torney’s duty of candor to the court).
59. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. at 367.
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1) (2009).
61. Id. 1.16(c).
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an appearance in a matter, withdrawal is only allowed by order of the
court.62
Courts have noted that ghostwriting allows attorneys to circum-
vent rules requiring the permission of the court before an attorney can
withdraw from representation.63  The purpose of rules requiring an
attorney to seek approval of the court in order to withdraw is to en-
sure there is proper communication between the litigants and the
court and to make certain the litigant has reasonable notice prior to
the attorney’s disengagement from the case.64  By not signing a plead-
ing they have drafted, ghostwriting attorneys sidestep the require-
ment that they gain the court’s permission before withdrawing, as
would be required if they had signed the pleading.65
Thus, the courts adopting the majority stance admonishing the
practice of ghostwriting find that when an attorney anonymously
prepares pleadings for a pro se litigant, the attorney violates the ethi-
cal and substantive obligations imposed on members of the bar.66
C. The Minority
In In re Liu,67 the Second Circuit broke from the majority stance
that ghostwriting constitutes a violation of procedural and ethics
rules.68  The case arose when attorney Fengling Liu was referred to
the Second Circuit’s Committee on Attorney Admissions and Griev-
ances for a number of concerns, one of which was several pro se peti-
tioners Liu assisted in preparing documents for appeal without
disclosing her involvement.69  The Committee found clear evidence
that Liu engaged in “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” and
recommended she be publically reprimanded for her misconduct.70
62. See, e.g., Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. at 986; Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportu-
nity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1997).
63. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079.
64. Id. (stating that withdrawal is allowed only after reasonable notice has been
given to the party being represented).  A common concern is that terminating
representation of a client mid-case will disadvantage the client, causing the client
to miss an imminent deadline in the case or generally setting back the client’s
case because a new attorney will require extra time to be brought up to speed.
See, e.g., Hansen v. Brognano, 137 A.D.2d 880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (illustrating
the harms a client can face if her counsel terminates representation days before
the statute of limitations on her claim runs).
65. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079.
66. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 767 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
67. 664 F.3d 367 (2d Cir. 2011).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 376–78, 381.  The Grievance Committee was also looking into concerns that
there were deficiencies in briefs prepared by an attorney under Liu’s supervision,
that six cases filed by Liu were dismissed due to her failure to follow the briefing
schedules, and finally that Liu filed thirteen cases in the incorrect venue. Id.
70. Id. at 387–88.
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The In re Liu court adopted all of the Committee’s findings except
the finding that Liu violated her duty of candor in ghostwriting peti-
tions for review.71  After laying out the precedent established against
ghostwriting, the In re Liu court examined numerous bar association
ethics committee opinions on ghostwriting that suggested a growing
inclination to accept the practice of ghostwriting.72  Ultimately, the
court concluded that Liu’s ghostwriting was not grounds to sanction
her for misconduct.73
The In re Liu court looked to the ABA’s Formal Opinion on Undis-
closed Legal Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in addressing critics’ con-
cerns that ghostwriting violates Rule 11.74  In that opinion, the ABA
concluded that, as long as the pro se litigant does not make an “affirm-
ative representation, attributable to the attorney, that the pleadings
were prepared without an attorney’s assistance,” it would not be dis-
honest for a lawyer to draft anonymous pleadings for the pro se liti-
gant.75  The Committee reasoned that a lawyer only falls under the
requirements of Rule 11 when she “make[s] an affirmative statement
to the tribunal concerning the matter.”76  Thus, because ghostwriting
attorneys do not sign the pleadings, they are not subject to the rule
and, therefore, cannot violate its requirements.77 In re Liu also looked
to the New York County Lawyer’s Association Committee (NYCLA) on
Professional Ethics, which had similarly concluded it was ethically
permissible for an attorney to draft pleadings for a pro se litigant
without disclosing the lawyer’s involvement to the tribunal.78  The
NYCLA committee determined that a lawyer only needed to disclose
she prepared the pleadings when nondisclosure would constitute mis-
representation or if a rule, order, or statute required it.79
Next, In re Liu found critics’ concerns regarding pro se litigants
with ghostwritten briefs being unfairly afforded the benefit of liberal
construction may be unwarranted.80  The ABA reasoned that “if the
undisclosed lawyer has provided effective assistance, the fact that the
lawyer was involved will be evident to the tribunal,” and liberal con-
71. Id. at 369.
72. Id. at 369–70.
73. Id. at 372–73.
74. See id. at 370 (citing ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
07-446, at 4 (2007) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 07-446], available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/media/youraba/2007/07/07_446
_2007.authcheckdam.pdf.).
75. Id. at 371 (citing ABA Formal Op. 07–446, supra note 74, at 4).
76. ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 74, at 4.
77. Id.
78. In re Liu, 664 F.3d at 371 (citing N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Eth-
ics, Op. 742, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter NYCLA Op. 742], available at http://www.
nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1348_0.pdf.)
79. Id.
80. Id. at 370–71 (citing ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 74, at 3).
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struction will not be applied.81  Conversely, if the lawyer’s undisclosed
assistance was ineffective, the ABA concluded, “the pro se litigant will
not have secured an unfair advantage” by the court applying the lib-
eral pleading standard.82  The NYCLA committee, in its ethics opin-
ion, similarly found that “ghostwritten pleadings would not be
unfairly accorded liberal construction.”83
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Unreality of the Majority Stance
The relatively brief opinion in In re Liu fails to address in detail all
of the legitimate concerns about ghostwriting raised by courts in the
majority circuits.  However, In re Liu remains an important decision
on the issue of ghostwriting because it signals a likely and necessary
change on the stance of ghostwriting.
Most cases condemning ghostwriting were decided prior to recent
changes in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  ABA For-
mal Opinion 07-446, which determined the practice of ghostwriting
was not against the Model Rules, was adopted in 2007.84  However, all
but two of the aforementioned cases disparaging ghostwriting were
decided prior to 2007.85  Perhaps even more significant, all but three
of these precedents were established before the ABA—and subse-
quently, forty-one states—revised the Model Rules to permit limited-
scope representation.86  These circumstances are significant because
they raise serious doubts about the relevance of such decisions to the
81. Id. at 370 (quoting ABA Formal Op. 07–446, supra note 74, at 3) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
82. Id. at 371 (quoting ABA Formal Op. 07–446, supra note 74, at 3) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
83. Id. (citing NYCLA Op. 742, supra note 78, at 4).
84. ABA Formal Opinion 07-446, supra note 74, at 1.
85. See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325
(1st Cir. 1971); Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Clarke v.
United States, 955 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Va. 1997); United States v. Eleven Vehi-
cles, 966 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportu-
nity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, 987 F.
Supp. 884 (D. Kan. 1997); Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Fremont,
868 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762 (Bankr. D.S.C.
2003); see also Liguori v. Hansen, No. 2:11-CV-00492-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL
760747, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2012) (stating that “ ‘[g]host-writing’ is inappropri-
ate” because it harms the opposing party and evades responsibilities under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 8.4 of the Nevada Rules of
Professional Conduct); Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1222
(D. Haw. 2010) (agreeing with other federal courts that the practice of ghost-
writing is inappropriate).
86. ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 7–8 (establishing that Model Rule 1.2 was
revised in 2002 to permit limited-scope representation).  All but three of the
aforementioned cases condemning ghostwriting were decided prior to this revi-
sion. See cases cited supra note 85. See also ABA UNBUNDLING FACT SHEET,
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current legal reality, where limited-scope representation is regularly
utilized.
While it is perhaps not surprising that the precedents established
prior to 2002 do not give much consideration, if any, to the role and
implications of unbundled legal services, even the cases decided after
2002 only mention limited-scope representation in a peripheral man-
ner.  Of the eight cases decided before 2002, only Laremont-Lopez87
and Johnson88 mention limited-scope representation or unbundled le-
gal services in some manner, and only in Laremont-Lopez were unbun-
dled legal services central to the analysis of the ghostwriting issue in
the case.89  In Laremont-Lopez, the attorneys argued that because the
clients had retained them for the sole purpose of drafting the com-
plaints, their representation of the clients had concluded by the time
the complaints were filed with the court.90  The court found that while
the attorneys’ reasoning was not at odds with the plain language of
Rule 11, their actions undermined the purpose of the signature re-
quirements of the rule.91  Of three cases decided after 2002, neither
Smallwood92 nor In re Mungo93 mentioned limited-scope representa-
tion in any capacity.  In Liguroi, one of the complaints brought against
the plaintiffs was that their attempt to unbundle legal services was an
ethical violation.94  However, the court dismissed this claim, noting
that the plaintiff had not anonymously written pleadings on behalf of
the pro se litigant and further that the cases the defendant cited on
the issue of unbundling were from a noncontrolling jurisdiction.95
Thus, the court never addressed how limited-scope representation and
ghostwriting relate.  While these cases may have been decided cor-
rectly at the time, the fact that all of these cases inadequately consider
ghostwriting in the context of limited-scope representation places
them at odds with the current legal realities, where limited-scope rep-
resentation is a widely accepted practice.
Thus, the circumstances under which the majority stance against
ghostwriting was established are no longer reflective of the controlling
rules and realities of the practice of law today.  The precedents in
many jurisdictions that forbid the practice of ghostwriting are at odds
supra note 13 (establishing that forty-one states have adopted the revised Model
Rule 1.2 or a variation thereof).
87. 968 F. Supp. at 1077–79.
88. 868 F. Supp. at 1229–31.
89. In Johnson, the court’s mention of limited-scope representation concerned the at-
torney’s attempt to represent a sheriff only in his official capacity and not his
individual capacity and did not relate to the ghostwriting claim. Id.
90. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1078.
91. Id.
92. 730 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Haw. 2010).
93. 305 B.R. 762 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
94. 2012 WL 760747, at *5.
95. Id. at *5–6.
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with the widespread adoption of rules permitting limited-scope repre-
sentation.96  The result is that lawyers are stuck in a grey zone, where
conflicting rules give them little guidance as to what course of action
is allowed.  To cloud the matter further, a growing number of states
have issued ethics opinions permitting the practice of undisclosed
ghostwriting.97  Although ethics opinions are advisory and do not cre-
ate rules binding on the court,98 the existence of such opinions sup-
porting ghostwriting not only shows the widening support of the legal
community for the practice, but also creates a “safe harbor” that law-
yers may rely on in good faith.99
B. The Inadequacies of In re Liu and ABA Formal Opinion
07-466
It is clear that the majority stance against ghostwriting fails to
take into account recent changes in ethical rules permitting unbun-
dled legal services—and the growing trend of ethics committees en-
dorsing the practice of ghostwriting.  However, despite recognizing the
growing acceptance of unbundled legal services, it is also clear that
the court’s holding in In re Liu—and ABA Formal Opinion 07-446
upon which the holding is founded—are far from being without faults.
ABA Formal Opinion 07-446 asserted that ghostwriting does not
flout Rule 11 because only attorneys who physically sign pleadings
make an affirmative statement to the tribunal and, therefore, fall
under the scope of Rule 11.100  While ghostwriting may not facially be
at odds with Rule 11, the ABA’s interpretation of Rule 11 in Formal
Opinion 07-446 is unreasonably narrow.  A central principle of Rule 11
is that “attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to refrain
96. Cf. Rothermich, supra note 6, at 2728 (warning courts against “stifling the devel-
opment of these new models of legal practice [such as limited-scope representa-
tion] through applications of ethical and procedural norms that were designed
with full-service, traditional representation in mind”).
97. See generally NYCLA Op. 742, supra note 78; N.C. St. Bar, 2008 Formal Ethics
Op. 3 (2009); Utah St. Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 08-01 (2008),
available at http://www.utahbar.org/rules_ops_pols/ethics_opinions/op_08_01.
html; N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 713 (2008), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/ACPE713.pdf; St. Bar of Ariz.
Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 05-06 (2005), available at http://www.
azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=525.
98. Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 731, 745 (2002) (noting that the “regulation of the legal profession is
primarily the responsibility of state courts” and that while ethics committees
help fill in the gaps they do not create enforceable legal authority).
99. See, e.g., Weeman, supra note 52, at 1064 (observing how Opinion 05–06 author-
izing the practice of undisclosed ghostwriting could act as a “safe harbor” because
the court may choose to not sanction an attorney who violated the state ethics
rules against the practice of ghostwriting if the attorney had relied in good faith
on the Bar Committee’s ethics opinion).
100. ABA Formal Op. 07–446, supra note 74, at 4.
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from conduct that makes administering civil actions unjust or ineffi-
cient.”101  Because two of the main concerns courts have about ghost-
writing are the possible unfairness and inefficiency it can create, the
ABA’s narrow interpretation of the rule is inapposite.102  Further-
more, since Rule 11 specifically provides that the court may sanction
“any attorney, law firm or party [that is] responsible for the viola-
tion,”103 there is little question that an attorney need not sign a plead-
ing to fall under the scope of Rule 11.104  Thus, at the very least, these
observations and critiques of ABA Formal Opinion 07-446’s response
to Rule 11 concerns call into question the sufficiency of the response.
The minority position is inadequate in its consideration of how
ghostwriting might create unfairness, or the perception of unfairness,
in the judicial process.  On the issue of the liberal construction af-
forded to pro se pleadings, the minority asserts that if the attorney’s
representation is effective, the liberal pleading standard will not be
applied.105  Conversely, if the attorney’s assistance is ineffective, the
minority argues the pro se litigant will not receive an unfair advan-
tage by having their pleading construed liberally.106  ABA Formal
Opinion 07-446 points out that courts are frequently able to effectively
identify ghostwritten pleadings and accordingly can refuse to apply
the liberal pleading standard when it is unwarranted.107  However,
the minority’s reasoning fails to consider that pro se litigants with
ghostwritten briefs receive an unfair advantage because they need
only have a “minimally sufficient pleading[ ].”108  While parties with
counsel only have one chance for their pleading to be construed advan-
tageously, pro se litigants are essentially afforded two chances—first,
if the ghostwriter attorney’s pleading is deemed sufficient and second,
if the attorney has not been effective in his or her representation,
under the liberal pleading standard.109
Further, while pro se litigants may not be actually or unfairly ad-
vantaged by the practice of ghostwriting, the perceived unfairness
that results from ghostwriting is against public policy.110  The Su-
preme Court has stated that even the appearance of impropriety
should be prevented.111  So, arguably, the appearance of unfairness
101. Justman, supra note 14, at 1270.
102. Id.
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)
104. Cf. Justman, supra note 14, at 1270.
105. In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 370–71 (2d Cir. 2011).
106. Id.
107. ABA Formal Op. 07-446, supra note 74, at 3.
108. Justman, supra note 14, at 1268.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1269.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 482 (1995).
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alone makes undisclosed ghostwriting contrary to public policy and is
a reason for not permitting the practice of ghostwriting.112
These logical inadequacies in defense of undisclosed ghostwriting
raise serious questions and clearly show that, for all the deficiencies in
the majority’s holding against ghostwriting, there are still legitimate
concerns that need to be addressed.  Unlike the majority stance, In re
Liu and ABA Formal Opinion 07-446 both recognize that “undisclosed
legal assistance to pro se litigants constitute[s] a form of limited repre-
sentation, pursuant to . . . Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.2(c).”113  However, the fact remains that a gap exists between law-
yers’ duties under the ethical rules and the practice of ghostwriting,
even as it falls within the broader practice of limited-scope representa-
tion.  An assessment of the reasons behind this disconnect will reveal
possible solutions to remedy the problem.
C. Rectifying the Contradictions Between the Precedents
and the Rules
1. The Reasons Behind the Contradictions
While the ABA and most states have adopted model rules that per-
mit the practice of limited-scope representation114—of which ghost-
writing is a part—many ethical and procedural rules are still at odds
with undisclosed ghostwriting.  These inconsistencies in the ethical
rules create a discrepancy in the way the rules are applied.  Lawyers
who undertake limited-scope representations are treated the same,
and have the same legal and ethical obligations, as lawyers who en-
gage a client under traditional full-scale representation.115  While no
proponent of ghostwriting and unbundled legal services has argued
that lawyers engaged in limited-scope representation should be sub-
ject to less stringent ethical standards, ghostwriting and limited-scope
representation do present challenges that are different than full-scale
representation.  The fact that the vast majority of the current ethical
and procedural rules were created with the assumption of full-scale
representation creates problems as courts seek to apply these rules to
limited-scope representations.116
These contradictions within the rules are what make the practice
of ghostwriting problematic in the first place.  Many lawyers choose
112. Id.
113. In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing ABA Formal Op. 07–446, supra
note 74, at 1).
114. Cf. ABA UNBUNDLING FACT SHEET, supra note 13 (noting that forty-one states
have adopted rules that permit limited-scope representation).
115. Cf. id. (“Unbundled services are not a short-cut or second-class services.  Lawyers
who unbundle must provide competent representation, and must follow all other
ethical and procedural rules in their jurisdiction.”).
116. Cf. supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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not to sign their names to pleadings they have drafted for pro se cli-
ents—the single act that creates all of the problems and concerns that
the majority bemoans about undisclosed ghostwriting—because they
worry about being conscripted into full-service representation.117
Most courts consider drafting a pleading to constitute entering an ap-
pearance in a case.118  Even though the rules allow for limited-scope
representation, in many states it is not clear whether an attorney en-
gaged in limited-scope representation needs permission to withdraw
from a case, regardless of the terms of a limited-scope-representation
agreement.  In fact, at least one case explicitly stated the court would
have required the ghostwriting attorney to seek permission from the
court to withdraw if the attorney had signed the pleadings, despite the
attorney and client’s agreement to undertake a limited-scope repre-
sentation.119  Not only does such action undermine the purpose of un-
bundled legal services by denying attorney and client control of the
scope of representation, but it also perpetuates the perceived need for
attorneys to not sign pleadings they have written for pro se litigants.
The problem, therefore, rests not with ghostwriting itself, but rather
with the uncertainties created by ethical and procedural rules de-
signed with the assumption of full-scale representation.
2. Proposed Solutions to Remedy the Disconnect
The analysis of the majority and minority positions makes clear
that both stances are flawed and reform is necessary to rectify the dis-
crepancies between ghostwriting as a part of limited-scope representa-
tion, as well as discrepancies between ghostwriting and the ethical
and procedural obligations to which lawyers are bound.  Under the
status quo, the inconsistencies between the rules that permit limited-
scope representation and the rules written with the assumption of
full-scale representation in mind create a grey area, where even law-
yers who make a good faith effort to follow the ethical rules may run
afoul.120  Several different solutions have been proposed to eliminate
the problems associated with ghosting, including eliminating ghost-
writing altogether or requiring anonymous disclosure of attorney in-
117. Justman, supra note 14, at 1256.
118. Cf. Michael W. Loudenslager, Giving up the Ghost: A Proposal for Dealing with
Attorney “Ghostwriting” of Pro se Litigants’ Court Documents Through Explicit
Rules Requiring Disclosure and Allowing Limited Appearances for Such Attor-
neys, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 123–24 (2008) (stating that customarily an attorney
signing and filing a pleading constitutes making an appearance in court).
119. Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079
(E.D. Va. 1997).
120. Cf. Weeman, supra note 52, at 1054–55, 1064 (noting that an attorney might rely
in good faith on the nonbinding Formal Opinion 05-06, which suggests ghost-
writing is ethical, even though the binding ethical rules in Arizona do not permit
attorneys to enter a limited appearance in the context of ghostwriting).
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volvement in drafting pro se pleadings.  However, as the following
analysis will show, only mandating disclosure in conjunction with
amending termination rules addresses the inconsistencies in the rules
that make ghostwriting problematic.
a. Eliminating Ghostwriting
Omitting ghostwriting as a permissible form of limited-scope rep-
resentation would fail to eliminate the Rule 11 and liberal pleading
concerns posed by the practice of ghostwriting.  While unequivocally
prohibiting ghostwriting would likely reduce the numbers of ghost-
written pleadings the court receives, given the secretive nature of
ghostwriting, such a ban would not likely stop its practice entirely.
Consequently, the court will still face the same problems of losing val-
uable time detecting ghostwritten pleadings and seeking to ascertain
the identity of attorneys who flout the rules.  Additionally, the elimi-
nation of ghostwriting is not realistic given the increasing trend of pro
se litigants.  The steady increase in pro se litigants that has occurred
over the past three decades will likely continue, and consequently, it is
in the best interest of the courts to adopt policies to help ease the ad-
ded burden such parties place on the legal system.
While many attorneys bemoan the problems that come with litigat-
ing against pro se parties,121 the fact is ghostwriting helps ease some
of these challenges.122  The court, opposing counsel, and pro se liti-
gants all benefit when a pleading is clearly written.  In those circum-
stances, the court can more easily evaluate the case on its merits and
the opposing counsel gains a clearer picture of what the pro se litigant
is actually arguing.123  While it is preferable and less complicated for
the court if counsel represents a party who would otherwise be a pro
121. Cummins, supra note 4, at 40 (remarking that going against a pro se litigant can
be a frustrating endeavor and that, due to the liberal pleading standard, it is
difficult to obtain an early dismissal of a case); Jennifer S. Forsyth, Pro Se Liti-
gants: On the Rise and Mucking Things Up, WALL ST. J. L. (Nov. 28, 2008), http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/11/28/pro-se-litigants-on-the-rise-and-mucking-things-up
(noting that pro se litigants make things worse for attorneys due to their unfamil-
iarity with the legal process, which clogs the courts and which can result in ex-
pensive and long-lasting mistakes).
122. See NYCLA Op. 742, supra note 78, at 5 (stating that, in the context of limited-
scope undisclosed representation, “many adversary counsels would readily admit
that having counsel involved makes proceedings easier, more efficient and
fairer”).
123. Goldschmidt, supra note 1, at 81 (observing that the Supreme Court noted the
plaintiffs in Winkleman v. Parma City School District, 550 U.S. 516 (1994), re-
ceived assistance from counsel before filing their complaint pro se).  In this arti-
cle, Goldschmidt also reasons this limited-scope representation most likely
included ghostwriting the plaintiffs’ complaint and argues the ghostwriting
benefitted the pro se litigants as well as the court by enabling the trial and re-
viewing court to figure out plaintiffs’ claim under the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Act. Id.
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se litigant, having some assistance from a lawyer is better than no
assistance.124
Furthermore, beyond easing the burdens of the court, by helping
pro se litigants navigate the legal system, ghostwriting helps ensure
reasonable access to the courts.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that reasonable access to the courts is a fundamental constitu-
tional right.125  As one court put it, “[o]ne of the basic principles, one
of the glories of the American system of justice is that the courthouse
door is open to everyone—the humblest citizen, the indigent, the con-
victed felon, the illegal alien.”126  However, access to the courts is not
very meaningful if individuals who are unable to afford full-scale rep-
resentation must choose to forgo their legal claims or struggle to navi-
gate the legal system on their own.  To the extent ghostwriting—and
limited-scale representation on the whole—helps pro se litigants over-
come these barriers, ghostwriting helps achieve reasonable access to
the courts.
b. Anonymous Disclosure
Seeking to find middle ground between eliminating ghostwriting
and allowing the practice to continue unfettered, some jurisdictions
have adopted a policy of anonymous disclosure.127  Under these rules,
ghostwriting attorneys need not sign the pleadings or reveal their
identity, but they are required to state on the documents that they
were “Prepared with Assistance of Counsel”128 or “Prepared by Coun-
sel.”129  While the anonymous disclosure requirements prevent courts
from unfairly applying the liberal pleading standard to ghostwritten
briefs, this approach does not eliminate the inefficiency caused when
it becomes necessary for the court to ascertain the identity of the at-
torney.  If a court needs to question the attorney about the accuracy of
the law or facts contained in the ghostwritten document130 or deter-
mines the attorney has violated some rule of professional responsibil-
ity, the court would be forced to expend time and judicial resources to
discover the attorney’s identity.131  Thus, despite resolving the liberal
pleading concerns, the anonymous disclosure approach is an inade-
quate solution to resolve the concerns surrounding ghostwriting.
124. See ABA WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 6 (stating that “the better the litigant is
prepared, the more efficiently the court operates” and that “choice in most venues
is a self-represented litigant who is well prepared or one who is not”).
125. Rothermich, supra note 6, at 2687–88.
126. NAACP v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 205–06 (D.D.C. 1985).
127. Loudenslager, supra note 118, at 132.
128. See Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 79–7 (2000).
129. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 1987–2 (1987).
130. Loudenslager, supra note 118, at 144.
131. Justman, supra note 14, at 1273–74.
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c. Mandating Disclosure and Amending Termination Rules
In order to rectify the uncertainties and contradictions in the ethi-
cal and procedural rules that make ghostwriting problematic, courts
should require ghostwriting attorneys disclose their identities, in con-
junction with amending local appearance rules.  Adopting rules that
recognize ghostwriting as entering a limited appearance and making
clear that such conduct does not require the permission of the court to
terminate representation will allay attorneys’ concerns about being
unwittingly conscripted into full-scale representation.  Once such wor-
ries of being conscripted into full-scale representation are eliminated,
those attorneys will have no justifiable132 reason for not disclosing
their identity.  Furthermore, making clear that ghostwriting does not
constitute entering an appearance in a case would reconcile the incon-
sistent manner in which limited-scope representation is treated in the
rules—recognizing limited-scope representation as permissible but
regulating its practice through ethical and procedural rules created
under the assumption of full-scale representation.
Mandating disclosure of ghostwriting attorneys’ identities and
clarifying termination rules eliminates all of the problems posed by
ghostwriting, without jeopardizing its practice.  As with anonymous
disclosure, mandatory disclosure would prevent the court from unnec-
essarily and unfairly applying the liberal pleading standard to the pro
se client’s ghostwritten brief.  Additionally, unlike the anonymous dis-
closure approach, mandatory disclosure also eliminates judicial ineffi-
ciency.  Under the mandatory disclosure approach, the pro se client
would still sign the brief or pleading, which is permitted under Rule
11 when a party is representing himself or herself.133  However, be-
cause the ghostwriting attorney’s name would also be present on the
132. Some commentators have noted that other reasons ghostwriting attorneys seek
to conceal their participation include 1) trying to gain a tactical advantage for
their clients in the litigation or 2) because a conflict prevents them from repre-
senting the party. E.g., id. at 1254–55.  These reasons are not an acceptable mo-
tive for ghostwriting, and consequently, the fact that mandatory disclosure would
thwart such practices is inconsequential. Id.  Still, others might argue that attor-
neys representing clients with unpopular causes have a justified reason to want
to conceal their identities. Id.  However, the Model Rules address this concern
saying that a lawyer’s representation of a client “does not constitute an endorse-
ment of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2009).  Thus, while it may be chal-
lenging for an attorney to represent a client with an unpopular cause, the Model
Rules—and the fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 has no excep-
tions—make it clear that representing such unpopular clients is not a justifica-
tion for the attorney to conceal his or her involvement in the case. Id.; FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(C)(1).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by a party
personally if the party is unrepresented.”).
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documents she prepared, the court will easily be able to question the
attorney if needed without a potentially time-consuming investigation
to determine an attorney’s identity.  Under these circumstances,
ghostwriting would no longer be at odds with Rule 11’s purpose “to
deter conduct that frustrates the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of civil actions.”134  Additionally, because the ghostwriting
attorney’s identity and involvement with the pleadings would not be
concealed, the attorney’s actions would not constitute misrepresenta-
tion nor would they be at odds with her duty of candor to the tribunal.
Some jurisdictions have already employed this solution, mandating
disclosure of attorney identities and involvement in ghostwriting,
while making clear in their rules that such conduct does not constitute
entering an appearance for purposes of withdrawal.135  For example,
Colorado amended its Rule 11 to specifically address situations involv-
ing limited representation.  The rule requires “pleadings or papers
filed by the pro se party that were prepared with the drafting assis-
tance of the attorney shall include the attorney’s name, address, tele-
phone number and registration number.”136  The rule also makes
clear that “[l]imited representation of a pro se party under this Rule
11(b) shall not constitute an entry of appearance by the attorney” for
the purposes of withdrawal.137  Florida, Maine, Nevada, Washington,
and Wyoming have approved similar rules mandating disclosure of a
ghostwriting attorney’s identity but clarifying that such practice of
limited-scope representation will not require permission of the court
in order for the attorney to withdraw from the case.138  These states
have taken the steps necessary to resolve the contradictions in the
ethical and procedural rules that make ghostwriting problematic.  As
such, these states should be a model for other states as they seek to
find ways to address the problems associated with the practice of
ghostwriting.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practice of ghostwriting is controversial and remains almost
universally condemned by the courts.  However, recent changes in the
rules permitting the practice of limited-scope representation should
compel courts to re-examine their hostilities to the practice and en-
courage the adoption of changes to the disclosure and termination
rules in order to allow ghostwriting to be openly practiced.
134. Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078
(E.D. Va. 1997).
135. Loudenslager, supra note 118, at 131–33.
136. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
137. Id.
138. Loudenslager, supra note 118, at 132–33.
676 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:655
This Note examined the majority stance against ghostwriting and
the minority position supporting ghostwriting and found that both
postures are flawed.  Most of the precedents that comprise the major-
ity stance were decided before courts authorized the practice of lim-
ited-scope representation and before the ABA found ghostwriting to be
an acceptable practice.  Even the opinions written after these develop-
ments gave little or no consideration to how ghostwriting was related
to the general practice of limited-scope representation.  Failure to ad-
dress ghostwriting in the context of limited-scope representation seri-
ously undermines the majority stance, as it is at odds with the current
legal reality.  The minority’s support of ghostwriting failed to ade-
quately understand the rules and their application, thus overlooking
numerous ethical and procedural problems posed by the practice of
ghostwriting.
Next, this Note found the problems associated with ghostwriting
stem from contradictions and inconsistencies in the rules.  Although
limited-scope representation has been adopted as an acceptable prac-
tice by most jurisdictions, the rules the courts use to regulate its prac-
tice were designed to operate with full-scope representation.  As a
result, in many jurisdictions the rules that permit an attorney to re-
present a client in a limited scope obstruct the same attorney from
terminating that representation in the context of ghostwriting.  This
Note argued that the growth of pro se litigants made eliminating the
practice of ghostwriting unrealistic and unwise. Ultimately, this Note
proposed that courts should amend their rules to mandate disclosure
of the ghostwriting attorney’s identify and make clear that the prac-
tice of ghostwriting does not require the attorney seek permission
from the court to withdraw from the case.  The practice of ghost-
writing is not only important for ensuring low-income individuals ade-
quate access to justice, but it can also be an important tool for helping
ease the additional burdens pro se litigants place on the courts and
opposing parties.  With the right reforms, the specter of ghostwriting
can be clearly viewed in the light of day, exposing the apparitions that
shroud the efforts of the judicial system to provide efficient and effec-
tive legal services to everyone—“the humblest citizen, the indigent,
the convicted felon, the illegal alien”139—as our Constitution
intended.
139. NAACP v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 205–06 (D.D.C. 1985).
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